The Pegasus Review: UCF
Undergraduate Research Journal
Volume 12

Issue 2

Article 1

2020

Post-Judgment Recovery and its Effectuation on the
Contemporary Debtors' Prison: A Treble Analysis on Collections
Law in the State of Florida
Andrew E. Weiner
University of Central Florida, andrewweiner@knights.ucf.edu

Part of the Law Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Undergraduate Research at STARS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Pegasus Review: UCF Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized editor of
STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Weiner, Andrew E. (2020) "Post-Judgment Recovery and its Effectuation on the Contemporary Debtors'
Prison: A Treble Analysis on Collections Law in the State of Florida," The Pegasus Review: UCF
Undergraduate Research Journal: Vol. 12 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol12/iss2/1

Post-Judgment Recovery and its Effectuation on the Contemporary Debtors'
Prison: A Treble Analysis on Collections Law in the State of Florida
Cover Page Footnote
Please note that following entry is an edited essay of a larger work that was previously published through
the Burnett Honors Collage in May of 2019; these edits have been implemented to allow for the ease of
the reader and to fit within the parameters of the URJ.

This article is available in The Pegasus Review: UCF Undergraduate Research Journal: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/
urj/vol12/iss2/1

Weiner: Post-Judgment Recovery and its Effectuation on the Contemporary D

Vol. 12.2: 1-6

THE PEGASUS REVIEW:

Published
February 8th, 2020

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

Post-Judgment Recovery and its Effectuation on
the Contemporary Debtors' Prison: A Treble
Analysis on Collections Law in the State of
Florida
By: Andrew E. Weiner

Faculty Mentor: Mr. David Slaughter
UCF Department of Legal Studies

ABSTRACT: This paper will analyze the conflict between creditors’ inherent right for satisfaction of their outstanding
monetary judgments and the difficulties that debtors confront in satisfying the outstanding award levied against them.
To establish the theory that the civil justice system has “resuscitated” the antebellum debtors’ prison and infringed
upon principles of civil liberties, this paper will examine evidence in a three-pronged analysis of economics, history, and
a reflection on the American legal systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Filing a lawsuit, regardless of its aim, is to formally
“declare war” against another party for the legal right to
act, or not to act, in a specific circumstance. The courts
exist to determine which party deserves more justice
than the other. As a branch of our tripartite government,
the courts decide what is best for society. But what if our
court system fails to serve our society’s best interests? It is
incumbent upon those who are subjugated by the injustice
to denounce said injustice because it is one of the many
rights conferred to us by the Constitution. In the scope
of collections law, particularly post-judgment matters,
there lurks an injustice which allows for individuals to
be incarcerated for the nonpayment of debt. Given the
wealth of authorities who have addressed the issue ad
nauseum, one would believe that a proper solution has
been attained—sadly, we have not yet found one. Here
we will discuss, in a two-part analysis, where we derived
the laws and principles that allowed debtor incarceration
to happen and the inherent issues with legal systems.
I. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE ANTEBELLUM
DEBTORS' PRISON OF ENGLAND AND THE
CONVEYANCE OF COMMON LAW TO THE
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CIVIL LEGAL SYSTEM
To demonstrate how the “contemporary debtors’ prison”
has ridden on the coattails of the bygone debtors’ prison,
it is pertinent to understand historical precedent. As
America’s debtor prisons have evolved from English
Common Law and its punitive systems of remuneration,
it is significant to mention the underpinnings of such a
system. Imprisonment for debt is not a historical oddity.
It is a lengthy tale beginning in the Medieval Period.
The recognition of imprisonment for debt in formal
English law in the Industrial Age was also the product
of purpose-driven aims for mitigating civil grievances.
See C. Fane, Esq., Observations on the Proposed Abolition
of Imprisonment for Debt on Mesne Process; Shewing Its
Probable Effects in Disabling Creditors from Forcing Their
Debtors into Bankruptcy, Trust-deeds, or Compositions.
London: S. Sweet, Law Bookseller and Publisher pg. 16
(1838). As the English author and philanthropist Dr.
Samuel Johnson has aptly put:
Surely, he whose debtor has perished in prison,
although he may acquit himself of deliberate
murder, must at least have his mind clouded with
discontent, when he considers how much another
has suffered from him; when he thinks on the wife
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol12/iss2/1

bewailing her husband, or the children begging
the bread which their father would have earned.
If there are any made so obdurate by avarice or
cruelty as to revolve these consequences without
dread or pity, I must leave them to be awakened
by some other power; for I write only to human
beings. Johnson, Idler No. 38 ( January 6, 1759).
Those who survived their terms of incarceration recollected
a life in squalor, where the stench of feces and the decay
of human flesh loomed through their dark cells wrought
of pitted iron and reinforced with muted colored stone.
Their treatment within that institution was comparable
to that of feral animals whose confiners would induce
living terror by sheer brutality and starvation. Wardens
regarded these indigent debtors as indistinguishable
from those imprisoned for “true” crimes, and many of
these debtors were forced to interact with these inmates
or even housed in single cells alongside them.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
population of incarcerated debtors was around tenthousand per annum and their numbers rose to become
more than half the total incarcerated population of
England. See Stephen Ware, A 20th Century Debate About
Imprisonment for Debt, 54 Am. J. of Leg. Hist. 351, ( July
2014). Social and political attention rose as reformists
and philosophers mounted an offensive against this
“aberration” by virtue of moral and Christian religious
platforms. These activists reinterpreted debtors’ financial
weaknesses as pitiful rather than punishable. Moreover,
they believed that the current state of affairs produced
the “decadence” of society, which fostered the greed of
those who benefited from debtors’ ignoble station. This
position was also influenced by the recognition that
human beings should be treated with due fairness given
the bounds set by Christian philosophy.
That dogma inspired the reformists to argue that the
human soul is a precious item—they reasoned that the
soul was an item of immeasurable value, so no quantifiable
monetary value justified its shackling. From a more
secular perspective, reformists further reasoned that
incarcerating debtors was simply poor execution of law
and that those incarcerated for debt were the consequence
of financial “misfortune” rather than “malfeasance.”
Under that standing law, both circumstances were
deemed equally culpable due to the vague perception
of what constituted criminality. Proponents for debtor
incarceration reasoned that mishandling the property of
others was a form of “notorious conduct,” since one party
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caused a loss to another, and losing money implies some
sort of wrongdoing. See Gustav Peebles, Washing Away
the Sins of Debt: The Nineteenth-Century Eradication of the
Debtors' Prison, 55 Comparative Studies in Society and
History 701–724 (2013).
The reformists aimed to construct a system that would
enable the courts to determine the culpability debtors
faced and to practice it with impartiality. Categorizing
acts of fraud from “grievous culpability, the grievous
from the mitigated culpability, and this last from perfect
innocence” allowed for the dividing line between true
criminals and simple debtors to be drawn. This division
curtailed repugnant abuses to the system, like the filing
of fraudulent debt claims against innocent parties and
sloppy fact-finding in unjustly expedited trials. See
Beccaria, Cesare, On Crimes and Punishments and other
Writings, Bellamy, R., ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. CrossRef, 90 (1995). Eventually, by
the mid-to-late nineteenth century, English law caught
up with popular demands that recognized the injustice
so abhorred by the English citizenry. The Bankruptcy
Act of 1869 cauterized the wounds that bled the life
and liberty of the populace, stating in section four of its
decree that “no person shall, after the commencement of
this Act, be arrested or imprisoned for making default
in payment of a sum of money,” unless “fraudulent”
grounds exist for nonpayment. See WALLACE
THODAY, IMPRISONMENT BY JUSTICES FOR
NON PAYMENT OF MONEY, 5 (1936).
Simultaneously, across the Atlantic, a budding nation
also grappled with the institutional management of
debtors. The practice of debtor imprisonment did not
halt at the borders of England, as its colonial progeny
embraced it as well. The development of debtors’ prison
in the United States, which relied upon the selfsame
objectives and societal strife as its English counterpart,
played an intriguing ideological role in the development
of American civil law. Federally abolished in the first
third of the nineteenth century, debtor relief came more
than three decades earlier than in England. See House
Report, Abolish imprisonment for debt, 22nd Congress, 1st
Session, January 17, 1832. Prior to that enactment, almost
all the states failed to recognize the civil liberties of the
debtor and struggled to determine a humane means for
addressing indebtedness. It was by the precedent setting
of New York legislators that the first official round of
debtor rights were addressed statutorily. The rest of the
states followed suit shortly thereafter. See New York
State Legislature, An act to abolish imprisonment for debt,
Published by STARS, 2020

and to punish fraudulent debtors, April 26, 1831.
During the active state of the former debtors’ prison,
Pennsylvania particularly comes to the fore when
discussing collections laws. This state is unique in that it
was affected most by English law largely due to the scope
of its economy. Upon becoming a large mercantile hub
at around the time of the pre-revolutionary era, during
the late seventeenth century, it was no surprise that its
development of creditor-debtor law arose as a response
to the demands of a booming economy. Merchants
and lenders commonly faced delinquent accounts
in commercial and consumer settings when serving
the needs of their community. In response to these
unsatisfied and disgruntled creditors, Pennsylvania’s
general assembly enacted statutes to coerce debtors into
compliance and to determine terms of incarceration for
debt. These statutes later inspired the other American
colonies seeking the redress of civil financial wrongs.
Yet, even with these early collections laws, Pennsylvania
recognized the impracticality of perpetually detaining
debtors since they would offer little to no utility while
incarcerated. Therefore, to address the aim of actually
recompensing the creditor, Pennsylvania law provided
the debtor the opportunity to free himself and be released
unto society under a contract for indentured servitude.
(Shaiman, S. Laurence, The History of Imprisonment for
Debt and Insolvency Laws in Pennsylvania as They Evolved
from the Common Law, 4 The American Journal of Legal
History, 207-212 (1960.)) This act of freeing the debtor,
for the sake of debt restitution, could be considered
the forerunner of the “purge” in contempt cases in
contemporary courts.
The ability to purge oneself, in the context of the civil
judicial rules of procedure, is to free oneself of judicial
contempt by exonerating the contemnor, the one
who acted willfully and wantonly disobedient, of the
consequences of one’s actions. An Order for Contempt
is levied against an individual who fails to abide by the
mandates of the court. See 38.28, Fla. Stat. (2018).
This procedure is based on the redeeming act that the
contemnor demonstrates, specifically by apologizing for
disobedience and providing rectification of the issue at
contention in the contempt order. (See Fla. Fam. Law
R. Proc. 12.615(e) (2019), which demonstrates a general
nature of the ability to purge.) The purge is the figurative
key to the contemnor’s cell, as it is one of the final legal
remedies available for those who are subject to a civil
contempt charge.
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The action of purge is an aside from the order of
contempt. The purge is not applicable for those without
the actual contempt order granted by the presiding
judge in a trial. Like many of the foundational laws
that have been derived from the English, the American
legal system also adopted the Contempt of Court
from Common Law’s procedural rules. This adoption
allowed for a fluidity which enabled substantive laws
to be ingrained within the court system via procedural
facilitators. Hence, procedural and substantive law go
hand-in-hand. Procedural law concerns “the means and
method to apply and enforce those duties and rights,”
as determined by the “Due Process” clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2002)
(definition), U.S. Const. amend. V (Due Processes scope)
and U.S. Const. amend. XIV (applicability to the State).
Inversely, substantive law is defined by the Florida
Supreme Court as the “part of the law which creates,
defines, and regulates rights, or that part of the law which
courts are established to administer.” See Haven Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991). Given
those definitions, the Order for Contempt lies within the
procedural side of the law. Furthermore, the Contempt of
Court Order is a tool wielded to obtain a particular aim
in all aspects of law—to induce compliance and mitigate
disorder. Substantive law does not regulate the system
itself but merely establishes the boundaries of law. The
contempt order enables the furtherance of law because
it exists as a means for the application of law within
the court system itself. It can be viewed as analogous to
theory of a particular branch of study (substantive law)
and that of the actual practice of that study (procedural
law).
II. THE JUXTAPOSITION OF CONTEMPORARILY CIVIL
RENUMERATION AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THEIR
DICHOTOMOUS OBJECTIVES
It is widely recognized within the field of law that the
aims of civil and criminal courts are perpendicular
to one another. Civil courts aim to provide financial
reconciliation to the party who faced a wrongdoing, to
return them to a station similar to that which existed
prior to the wrongdoing. Criminal courts historically have
imposed a retributivist agenda, i.e., the criminal courts
seek redress for committed wrongs not by compensation
(civil agenda), but by means of institutional retribution.
Retribution appeals to the most innate satisfactions of
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol12/iss2/1

man’s character—redemption via the eye-for-an-eye
or violence begets violence approach. See Bronsteen, J.,
Buccafusco, C., & Masur, J., Happiness and Punishment,
76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1071 (2009). In the context of
collections law, the agendas of both civil and criminal
courts are not clearly defined.
In a civil legal matter, if the wronged party merited
justice, the courts would valuate the harm and quantify it
in dollars. In a criminal case, the courts would value the
harm by the wrongdoer and quantify justice as a period
of time that the wrongdoer must endure incarceration.
These are generalities, but they are representative of the
purpose of these systems in our society. So, why is it that if
a debtor in our modern society fails to satisfy a judgment,
they would face incarceration? Is it not counterintuitive
given the basic foundations of these systems? Why
legitimize compromises in civil liberties—the unalienable
right to be free from incarceration for debt—for the sake
of procedural compliance? One need not compromise in
this limited circumstance in postjudgment recovery.
Since the abolishment of the debtors’ prisons, American
law has plainly stated that no individual shall be subject
to incarceration for debt. (See above, Roman numeral
number two of this analysis for particular references in
history.) Although the procedural mechanism, like the
contempt of court, exists to promote justice for one
party, it is at the expense of another’s liberty. There is
no appropriate incarceration in the circumstance of
collections, regardless of the delay in repayment that the
creditor might face. Incarceration should be reserved for
criminal punishments, not those who are indebted and
subject to the contempt of court.
Philosophically speaking, one may reason that because
the judgment is the official acknowledgment of a debt,
any prior litigation is simply a matter at issue. Following
this logic, any debt existing prior to the judgment is
not a legally recognized debt, ergo there can be no legal
punishment for failing to satisfy. Therefore, if a contempt
charge was issued and pursued for failure to produce
requested documentation pre-judgment, then civil
liberties would not be infringed. In this circumstance,
the consequences of the contempt are not based on an
officially recognized debt, but rather serve as an avenue
for compliance from the party subject to the contempt.
On the other hand, if a (final) money judgment is
rendered and the contempt is pursued with the possibility
of incarceration, the debtor would be imprisoned. This
imprisonment would constitute a breach of the debtor’s
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civil liberties since that is an actual debt subject to
actual legal consequences. A debt without a judgment
would be a debt with no legal means for recovery, with
the exception of contacting the debtor via telephonic or
written means, i.e., dunning (demand) letters. Moreover,
dissatisfaction for the incarceration for debts has been
hotly debated in the areas of family and criminal law.
These cases, like those relating to failures in not paying
child support monies, or repaying the courts for criminal
fines and costs, are separate, related issues, but not
directly within the scope of this analysis. See Andrews v.
Walton, 428 So. 2d 663 (1983) (incarceration for willful
nonpayment of child support) and Bearden v. Ga., 461
U.S. 660 (1983) (criminal court incarceration for failure
to pay fine or fee). Children, when the financial supporter
fails to remit monetary support, will face undue hardship.
Therefore, children’s wellbeing supersedes the interests of
the supporter since solely the children’s “best interest” is
considered in court’s determinations of law. See Fla. Dep’t
of Children & Families v. X. X. G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (best interest determination wielded
throughout all matters that involve a child).
When discussing situations like Bearden, one must
consider that the debt at issue, i.e., the fines or fees
imposed by the courts, are sourced from criminal
wrongdoing. Unlike the civil counterpart discussed, the
criminal wrongdoer did not face unintended misfortune.
Criminals breached a tacitly ingrained covenant, by virtue
of their membership in their community, to remain free
from illicit action. By breaching that implied covenant,
the wrongdoer has degraded the social utility of that
community and hence done a wrong to all members. This
criminal also harms that community’s economic utility,
as the members are forced to pay the costs of the trial.
It is not unreasonable to impose a dual approach to
punishment in this circumstance—that is, courts should
incarcerate the criminal to mitigate further societal
harm and require restitution for the harm caused to
the community. In other words, given retributivism’s
ideals, if an individual causes harm to others, they
must recompense in every manner available to make
the punishment suitable for the crime. For the civil
wrongdoer, compared to the previous criminal wrongdoer,
punishing the debtor via imprisonment, following the
principles of retributivism, is an excessive punishment
that does not fit the harm done to society. Even if a civil
claim has criminal underpinnings, like the civil trial of
Orenthal James Simpson, the criminal courts, not the
civil legal system, exert institutional punishment—the
Published by STARS, 2020

circumstance must be worthy of bifurcating its criminal
and civil natures. See Goldman v. Simpson, 72 Cal. Rptr.
3d 729, 731, (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008).
Although the issues of domestic relations and criminal
court are related to the focus of “pure” civil incarceration,
they are not directly appropriate for the philosophies
proposed. These circumstances present additional
variables for consideration (children for family law and
society for criminal law) that are more important than the
inequities that the wrongdoer faces. In terms of valuation,
by way of utilitarian ideals, the collective’s wellbeing is
prioritized over the wellbeing of the individual. The civil,
post-judgment circumstance discussed differs from the
former in that it has no truly justifiable basis aside from
causing inequitable harm to the unfortunate.
SUMMATION
The failure to repay debts and its relation to civil
imprisonment is a questionable matter. It has been widely
accepted that no one individual or entity has a legal
obligation to repay their debts, but strictly a moral or
ethical obligation. However, by allowing post-judgment
pathways to imprisonment, the civil system undermines
itself, as the objectives of the criminal courts are melded
into the objectives of our civil courts. Unless fraud is
found, whether a debtor is insolvent, legally ignorant,
or willfully disobedient in post-judgment proceedings,
the principles of freedom should be prioritized over the
desires of the civilly vengeful. Debtors are not criminals,
and they do not deserve the actuality of imprisonment,
as this punishment is reserved for those who are
contraveners of the law.
Imprisonment is not the only means for inducement.
There exist many avenues for creditors to obtain the
records (or a debtor’s compliance) by more passive
and humane means, like requesting the production of
evidence from alternative sources, invoking bankruptcy or
using one of the varied execution actions available rather
than strictly pursuing the debtor to exhaustion. Levying
imprisonment in civil post-judgment proceedings is not
only against the plainly written laws of our nation, but it
is a feeble and primitive method to resolve an issue that
has been debated to exhaustion for over three centuries.
If our modern society is still incapable of comprehending
the fundamental principles vested in every one of us, then
little hope will exist for change in the realm of collections
law.
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